The principal critical objective of this dissertation is to examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem: dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism. The dualism examined is closely linked to Cartesian dualism, while functionalism is a form of materialism. Anomalous monism is a kind of dual aspect view. All these theories have a long tradition with different formulations and exponents. I examine three contemporary exponents of these views: Saul Kripke, a dualist, Donald Davidson, an anomalous monist, and Daniel Dennett, a functionalist. (...) ;I argue that each of these theories is incorrect or has serious difficulties. The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving an account of mind-body interaction. The chief difficulty for anomalous monism is that internal tensions within the theory relating to Davidson's conception of physical events and scientific laws have the consequence that anomalous monism applies to the entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the brain. The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting for the qualities of subjective experience. ;I then discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena: incorrigibility and intentionality. I consider the problem of mind-body interaction as a problem for dualism. I argue that the mind-body problem is misconceived in that it is supposed that a univocal definition of 'physical' can be given. I state three different definitions of this term: one containing a scientific conception, one an objective conception, and one a personal conception. ;In my final chapter, I formulate a plural aspect view that accounts for mind-body interaction. On this view, mind is an aspect of body and body is an aspect of mind. This plural aspect view can be derived from a more general theory I call Viewpoint Pluralism. (shrink)

People frequently see design in nature that reflects intuitive teleological thinking– that is, the order in nature that supports life suggests it was designed for that purpose. This research proposes that inferences are stronger when nature supports human life in particular. Five studies (total N = 1788) examine evidence for an anthro-teleological bias. People agreed more with design statements framed to aid humans (e.g., “trees produce oxygen so that humans can breathe”) than the same statements framed to aid other targets (...) (“trees produce oxygen so that leopards can breathe”). The bias was greatest when advantages for humans were well-known and salient (e.g., the ozone layer) and decreased when advantages for other targets were made explicit. The bias was not eliminated by highlighting the benefits for other species, however, and emerged spontaneously for novel phenomena (Jupiter’s gravity protects Earth from asteroids). We conclude that anthropocentric biases enhance existing teleological biases to see stronger design in phenomena where it enables human survival. (shrink)

Most cases of plagiarism involve a power differential where not every person has the same ability to enter into a social contract. A social contract requires that each party understands the expectations or norms of the contract, has a voice in setting or changing the norms and has the ability to exit the contract. If those with less power want to gain power then they have to engage in activities bound by norms set by others with little or no ability (...) to exit and no voice. Even if one determines that it is an option to choose a role that requires academic writing, even at the earliest grades, then the social contract demands a shared norm of what constitutes correct behavior. This study reviewed the abstracts of articles indexed in Google Scholar from 1999–2019 through the lens of integrative social contract theory and found, in the case of plagiarism, an existing consensus of correct behavior does not exist. Recommendations for establishing a social contract conclude the article. (shrink)

Let me offer an early disclaimer. I know exactly who the Founders were. I know exactly the crimes against humanity that they were responsible for and those they inherited and were not responsible for. I do not spend time extolling the virtues of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. Madison. Nothing in this work or in my experiment (my life's work) can change the fact or alter the history of the debasement of humanity that preceded the Declaration of (...) Independence (1776), the Constitution (1787), and the Bill of Rights (1791) they were a part of and the obvious fact that the major accomplishment of the Founders' theories about self-government did not apply to African Americans and Native Americans, women, and specifically Black women in their thinking. Still, there exists in their theological imagination infinite hope for their experiment. This work seeks to identify the evidence that shows and suggests that some of them were aware of a grand architectural experiment and design for the nation and its future. Every cracked, broken, and imperfect vessel can be used to bring forward hope. I am a personal witness to this fact of human existence. (shrink)

Several scholars have recognized the limitations of theories of moral reasoning in explaining moral behavior. They have argued that moral behavior may also be influenced by moral identity, or how central morality is to one’s sense of self. This idea has been supported by findings that people who exemplify moral behavior tend to place more importance on moral traits when defining their self-concepts (Colby & Damon, 1995). This paper takes the next step of examining individual variation in a construct highly (...) associated with immoral behavior — psychopathy. In Study 1, we test the hypothesis that individuals with a greater degree of psychopathic traits have a weaker moral identity. Within a large online sample, we found that individuals who scored higher on a measure of psychopathic traits were less likely to base their self-concepts on moral traits. In Study 2, we test whether this reduced sense of moral identity can be attributed to differences in moral judgment, which is another factor that could influence immoral behavior. Our results indicated that the reduced sense of moral identity among more psychopathic individuals was independent of variation in moral judgment. These results suggest that individuals with psychopathic traits may display immoral behavior partially because they do not construe their personal identities in moral terms. (shrink)

Retaliation against whistleblowers is a well-recognized problem, yet there is little explanation for why uninvolved peers choose to retaliate through ostracism. We conduct two experiments in which participants take the role of a peer third-party observer of theft and subsequent whistleblowing. We manipulate injunctive norms and descriptive norms. Both experiments support the core of our theoretical model, based on social intuitionist theory, such that moral judgments of the acts of wrongdoing and whistleblowing influence the perceived likeability of each actor and (...) ultimately influence intention to ostracize each actor and indicate more willingness to ostracize the whistleblower than the wrongdoer. When we vary norms for the wrongdoing in Experiment 1, we find that descriptive and injunctive norms indirectly influence intentions to ostracize both the wrongdoer and whistleblower. These relationships are serially mediated by the observers’ moral judgments of the act and likeability of the actor. When we vary norms for whistleblowing in Experiment 2, the injunctive norm manipulation affected moral judgment of the action of whistleblowing, and we do not observe any other significant effects of the norm manipulations on moral judgments of the actions of wrongdoing or whistleblowing. (shrink)

Dialogue semantics for logic are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula φ as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which different logics can be obtained through only small variations of the basic rules. We introduce the composition problem for dialogue games as the problem of resolving, for a set S of rules for dialogue games, whether the set (...) of S-dialogically valid formulas is closed under modus ponens. Solving the composition problem is fundamental for the dialogical approach to logic; despite its simplicity, it often requires an indirect solution with the help of significant logical machinery such as cut-elimination. Direct solutions to the composition problem can, however, sometimes be had. As an example, we give a set N of dialogue rules which is well-justified from the dialogical point of view, but whose set N of dialogically valid formulas is both non-trivial and non-standard. We prove that the composition problem for N can be solved directly, and introduce a tableaux system for N. (shrink)

À travers quels langages, outils et pratiques pouvons-nous comprendre la destruction écologique et la violence racialisée en tant que processus unifié à l’œuvre dans la production du monde? Comment pouvons-nous, à la fois, habiter et interrompre cette conjoncture catastrophique? Qui sommes-nous pour cela, d’ailleurs? Je m’inspire de la provocation de Christina Sharpe (2016) en faveur du « travail de sillage » pour étudier ces questions dans le contexte du monde océanique. En travaillant à travers différents genres et en puisant dans (...) diverses sources, j’expérimente des thèmes de perte, de sensation, d’échelle, d’incertitude, de persistance et de temps, pour chercher un récit qui pourrait suggérer un avenir différent au milieu d’une catastrophe en cours. (shrink)

This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer's Propositional Deontic Logic (PDₑL), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: "Never do that", or "Do this someday". In this paper, we will investigate how to amend (PDₑL) so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these (...) two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation. (shrink)

In this short paper, we show that a popular view in information science, information-as-thing, fails to account for a common example of information that seems physical. We then demonstrate how the distinction between types and tokens, recently used to analyse Shannon information, can account for this same example by viewing information as abstract, and discuss existing definitions of information that are consistent with this approach. -/- Dans ce court article nous montrons qu'une vision populaire en sciences de l'information, l'information en (...) tant qu’une chose, échoue à rendre compte d'un exemple commun d'information qui semble physique. Nous démontrons ensuite comment la distinction type/token, utilisée récemment pour analyser l'information de Shannon, peut rendre compte de ce même exemple en considérant l'information comme abstraite, et nous discutons des définitions existantes de l’information qui sont compatibles avec cette approche. (shrink)

Two years ago, the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics published volume 28, number 4, devoted to a symposium entitled Human Subjects Research and the Role of Institutional Review Boards - Conflicts and Challenges. I had the good fortune to be asked to serve as editor of that issue. In her introduction to the symposium, the then editor-in-chief of the journal, Ellen Wright Clayton, observed that the country is currently undergoing a major reexamination of how biomedical research is conducted. While (...) that reexamination has continued in the interim, some very recent events raise questions about the extent to which this will continue, at least in the short run, with equal vigor. The intervening years have witnessed a variety of new directions and events. The federal Office of Human Research Protections, directed by Dr. Greg Koski, who wrote a brief commentary for the last symposium,L has taken a new direction, strongly stressing the need for institutions and their institutional review boards ORBS) to engage in extensive educational and quality improvement efforts with both researchers and their own member. (shrink)

Two years ago, the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics published volume 28, number 4, devoted to a symposium entitled Human Subjects Research and the Role of Institutional Review Boards - Conflicts and Challenges. I had the good fortune to be asked to serve as editor of that issue. In her introduction to the symposium, the then editor-in-chief of the journal, Ellen Wright Clayton, observed that the country is currently undergoing a major reexamination of how biomedical research is conducted. While (...) that reexamination has continued in the interim, some very recent events raise questions about the extent to which this will continue, at least in the short run, with equal vigor. The intervening years have witnessed a variety of new directions and events. The federal Office of Human Research Protections, directed by Dr. Greg Koski, who wrote a brief commentary for the last symposium,L has taken a new direction, strongly stressing the need for institutions and their institutional review boards ORBS) to engage in extensive educational and quality improvement efforts with both researchers and their own member. (shrink)

Let N, O and S denote the set of nonnegative integers, the graph of the constant 0 function and the graph of the successor function respectively. For sets $P, Q, R \subseteq N^2$ operations of transposition, composition, and bracketing are defined as follows: $P^\cup = \{\langle x, y\rangle | \langle y, x\rangle \epsilon P\}, PQ = \{\langle x, z\rangle| \exists y\langle x, y\rangle \epsilon P & \langle y, z\rangle \epsilon Q\}$ , and [ P, Q, R] = ∪n ε M(PnQR (...) n). THEOREM. The class of recursively enumerable subsets of N2 is the smallest class of sets with O and S as members and closed under transposition, composition, and bracketing. This result is derived from a characterization by Julia Robinson of the class of general recursive functions of one variable in terms of function composition and "definition by general recursion." A key step in the proof is to show that if a function F is defined by general recursion from functions A, M, P and R then F = [ P∪, A∪ M, R]. The above definitions of the transposition, composition, and bracketing operations on subsets of N2 can be generalized to subsets of X2 for an arbitrary set X. In this abstract setting it is possible to show that the bracket operation can be defined in terms of K, L, transposition, composition, intersection, and reflexive transitive closure where K: X → X and L: X → X are functions for decoding pairs. (shrink)

Je défends ici la nécessité, et ébauche une première version, d’une théorie iconique des propositions. Selon celle-ci, les propositions sont comme les objets de représentation, ou similaires à eux. Les propositions, suivant cette approche, sont des propriétés que l’esprit instancie lorsqu’il modélise le monde. Je connecte cette théorie aux récents développements de la littérature académique sur les propositions, ainsi qu’à une branche de recherches en sciences cognitives, qui explique certains types de représentations mentales en termes d’iconicité. I motivate the need (...) for, and then sketch, an iconic theory of propositions according to which propositions are like or similar to their objects of representation. Propositions on this theory are properties that the mind instantiates when it models the world. I connect the theory to recent developments in the propositions literature as well as to a strain of cognitive science that explains some kinds of mental representation in terms of iconicity. (shrink)

In this paper the authors argue that research ethics committees should not be paternalistic by rejecting research that poses risk to people competent to decide for themselves. However it is important they help to ensure valid consent is sought from potential recruits and protect vulnerable people who cannot look after their own best interests. The authors first describe the tragic deaths of Jesse Gelsinger and Ellen Roche. They then discuss the following claims to support their case: competent individuals are (...) epistemologically and ethically in the best position to say which risks are reasonable for them, so RECs should be no more restrictive than the “normal” constraints on people taking risks with themselves; RECs do not judge individual competence ; individual liberty is mostly limited by what serves the public interest, and RECs do not determine public interest; RECs may have a paternalistic role in preventing exploitation of competent people vulnerable to the use of incentives, and in protecting the interests of incompetent people; however, the moral and political authority of RECs has not been established in this respect. (shrink)

Margaret Egan and Jesse Hauk Shera's original conception of social epistemology has never been defined unambiguously, or developed significantly beyond its early formulation. An interesting consequence of this lack of conceptual clarity has been the application of several interpretations of social epistemology. This article discusses how social epistemology was linked with the ideology of apartheid, and with racially segregated library and information services in the Republic of South Africa. In a fraudulent scientific vision for librarianship, social epistemology was assigned (...) a role that violated its original purpose. The intellectual content of social epistemology needs to be articulated in order to prevent further examples of such conceptual abuse. The paper ends with an attempt to do this with some suggestions based on Shera's own seminal ideas. (shrink)

With Being Me Being You, Samuel Fleischacker provides a reconstruction and defense of Adam Smith’s account of empathy, and the role it plays in building moral consensus, motivating moral behavior, and correcting our biases, prejudices, and tendency to demonize one another. He sees this book as an intervention in recent debates about the role that empathy plays in our morality. For some, such as Paul Bloom, Joshua Greene, Jesse Prinz, and others, empathy, or our capacity for fellow-feeling, tends to (...) misguide us in the best of cases, and more often reinforces faction and tribalism in morals and politics. These utilitarians, as Fleischacker refers to them, propose that empathy take a back seat to cost-benefit analysis in moral decision-making. As an intervention, the book is largely successful. Fleischacker’s defense of empathy is nuanced and escapes the myopic enthusiasm to which many partisans of empathy are prone. Anyone looking to understand the relationship between empathy and morality would do well to grapple with Being Me Being You. Still, Fleischacker overlooks that Smith would most likely be less convinced of the idea that greater empathy can help us overcome the great challenges of our time. (shrink)

Dans cette réponse à Giovanni Tuzet, on précise le sens de la thèse de l’ « empiétement pragmatique » et on soutient que les attributions de connaissance ne se font pas de manière contextuelle, et que les facteurs pragmatiques ne menacent pas la thèse évidentialiste.

Jérusalem, livre majeur de Moses Mendelssohn, est une apologie du judaïsme. Apologie dans le sens de Socrate : sommé de répondre aux accusations des hommes de la cité, Mendelssohn, le " Socrate de Berlin ", doit répondre de soi. Peut-on être juif et éclairé à la fois? Le juif des Lumières est-il pensable? Peut-il exister? Face à la critique moderne du judaïsme - celle qui trouve sa formulation la plus accomplie dans le Traité théologico-politique de Spinoza -, Mendelssohn formule une (...) réponse fondamentale, inaugurant ainsi la pensée juive moderne. Entendre cette réponse nécessite une lecture attentive de Jérusalem. Inspiré par la leçon de Franz Rosenzweig et d'Emmanuel Lévinas, et dans le sillage de l'enseignement de Benny Lévy, L'Apologie de Mendelssohn tente une telle lecture. Lecture sensible au retour à Platon s'opérant discrètement dans le penser de Mendelssohn : le Platon dialoguant, celui attaché à la vérité d'existence plutôt qu'à l'exactitude mathématico- logique. Mais lecture sensible aussi au retour à la sagesse des maîtres d'Israël qui s'opère nettement au sein de Jérusalem. Sagesse qui sait penser le commandement divin non pas comme loi politique mais comme possibilité singulière d'accorder vie et vérité. Sagesse permettant ainsi de repenser le sens de l'élection d'Israël et son rapport à l'universalisme. Mendelssohn a-t-il su rester fidèle à l'enseignement des maîtres d'Israël? A-t-il pu accorder jusqu'au bout élection et universalisme? Question ultime que pose L'Apologie de Mendelssohn, permettant enfin d'examiner les limites qu'il impose à la pensée juive dans son oeuvre. (shrink)

On a l’habitude de lire dans Antigone l’histoire d’un conflit entre d’un côté l’expression des liens affectifs et de la piété, et de l’autre les prérogatives de l’État dont le but premier serait le maintien des institutions. D’un côté Antigone fidèle à son frère, de l’autre Créon attaché à sa Cité. D’un côté la morale de l’affectivité ou de la conviction (Gesinnungsethik), de l’autre la morale de la responsabilité (Verantwortungsethik), pour parler comme Max Weber. Cette lecture classique de la tragédie (...) demeure sans doute pertinente à bien des égards, mais traduit-elle l’essentiel? Et si l’intention du poète n’avait pas été d’en rester à cette confrontation mais de suggérer, par-delà l’affrontement ruineux, une troisième voie possible? Il n’y aurait plus alors deux termes seulement, le privé et le public que tout sépare, mais deux manières pour l’ordre public lui-même de se rapporter au privé, l’une conflictuelle et tyrannique, celle de Créon, l’autre conciliatrice et délibérative – démocratique en ce sens –, celle défendue par Hémon, par Tirésias, et finalement peut-être par Sophocle lui-même qui, par l’emploi d’un vocabulaire tiré de l’expérience politique athénienne, dénoue d’une main l’intrigue qu’il noue de l’autre. Éclairée entre autres par Aristote, une interprétation nouvelle de la pièce en découle, celle d’un poète qui surjoue les conflits pour mieux insinuer les moyens politiques de les résoudre ou de les atténuer. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are (...) merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

Le philosophe, que caractérise selon Nietzsche la vertu d’indépendance, se trouve par là condamné à la solitude. Celle-ci toutefois ne doit pas être conçue de manière négative, comme un simple retrait hors du monde, ou comme un refus de toute relation et de toute altérité. L’individu n’est pas une substance, mais un complexe de forces, c’est-à-dire un « corps » qui est non seulement structuré à la manière d ’une communauté, mais aussi par les relations sociales externes dans lesquelles l’individu (...) se trouve d’abord engagé. La solitude ne doit pas en conséquence être confondue avec un simple état d’ isolement . Elle consiste en une épreuve , en un mouvement de conquête de la singularité, contre les valeurs du « troupeau » qui ont été incorporées. Une telle conquête requiert que soient considérés et questionnés les autres hommes et valeurs dans leur diversité. Et elle fait surgir l’exigence d’une communauté qui apparaît comme la condition paradoxale d’une solitude authentique. (shrink)

Éloignés aussi bien des grandes théories philosophiques de l'éducation que des préoccupations de la recherche scientifique rigoureuse, ces Propos impertinents sur l'éducation actuelle sont ceux d'un observateur attentif, aguerri et plein d'empathie pour son sujet, certes, mais qui essaye de rester toujours lucide et critique. Qu'il soit d'accord ou non avec les positions habituelles ou officielles, Gaston Mialaret veut témoigner, soit à travers quelques textes courts, soit à l'aide de petites scènes de la vie scolaire habituelle, soit à partir (...) de réflexions ou de commentaires plus généraux, du bon sens en éducation... bon sens qui devrait être, comme chacun sait, la chose du monde la mieux partagée. Tous les partenaires des situations d'éducation : élèves, enseignants, administrateurs, parents d'élèves entrent, à un moment ou à un autre, dans le collimateur de cet observateur impertinent. (shrink)

A timely and uniquely compelling plea for the importance of nurture in the ongoing nature-nurture debate. In this era of genome projects and brain scans, it is all too easy to overestimate the role of biology in human psychology. But in this passionate corrective to the idea that DNA is destiny, Jesse Prinz focuses on the most extraordinary aspect of human nature: that nurture can supplement and supplant nature, allowing our minds to be profoundly influenced by experience and culture. (...) Drawing on cutting-edge research in neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology, Prinz shatters the myth of human uniformity and reveals how our differing cultures and life experiences make each of us unique. Along the way he shows that we can’t blame mental illness or addiction on our genes, and that societal factors shape gender differences in cognitive ability and sexual behavior. A much-needed contribution to the nature-nurture debate, Beyond Human Nature shows us that it is only through the lens of nurture that the spectrum of human diversity becomes fully and brilliantly visible. (shrink)

There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.

In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account (...) of rationalization, based on Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and because we also have a desire to be consistent with ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for becoming better people over time, and that a similar case can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of people can proceed via rationalization. (shrink)

This contribution is concerned with the relevance of Hume’s empirical approach to the study of the mind for contemporary cognitive science. It is argued that Hume’s views, empirically founded as they were on observation and introspection and concerning ideas and concepts, passion and sympathy, and moral sentimentalism, find considerable support in the findings of contemporary research. To this extent, Hume may well be considered a precursor to many of today’s cognitive scientists, even though they do not generally draw directly from (...) his work. The fundamental significance of Hume’s own work is that it shows that philosophy has always had an empirical dimension. (shrink)